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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate entities have never been subject to international 
criminal prosecution for violations of international human rights or 
humanitarian law.1 As the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg explains, “[c]rimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”2 This traditional 
perspective on corporate accountability under international criminal 
law (“ICL”) reflects the long-accepted principle of societas 
delinquere non potest—a legal entity cannot be blameworthy—and 
informs the jurisdiction of all subsequent international criminal 
tribunals.3 For instance, the Rome Statute states that the International 
Criminal Court “shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant 
to this Statute” thereby immunising all non-natural, legal persons, 
such as corporations, from prosecution.4 
However, that is far from the complex story of corporate 
accountability under international criminal law, both past and 
present. A strong line of judicial precedents exist in which corporate 
executives, employees, and directors may be held personally and 
criminally liable for egregious abuses of human rights and 
humanitarian law, or complicity thereof.5 Nevertheless, whether 
international law is directly applicable to corporations, and whether 
courts or tribunals can hold corporations criminally accountable for 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, 
 1.  Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic 
Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 204 (2010). 
 2.  Nürnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (IMT 1946). 
 3.  ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 
(2010). 
 4.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3854.  
 5.  INTL. COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY, FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH: REPORT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON 
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remain in dispute amongst legal scholars.6 Broadly speaking, there 
are two divergent and seemingly contradictory views; one view 
suggests courts and tribunals cannot hold corporations liable for 
international crimes, while the other view asserts they can.7 
On this issue, as in so many others in international law, the 
considerable influence that Nuremberg continues to wield “cannot be 
overstated.”8 However, proponents of both views invoke the legal 
history of the Nuremberg-era, and, in particular, its treatment of 
major German corporations, to bolster their arguments.9 
Since the “critical turning point”10 of the IMT, convened in 1946 
at Nuremberg, Germany, the development of ICL has continued to 
eschew the traditional focus of international law on State 
responsibility in lieu of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for egregious violations of international human rights 
and humanitarian law.11 Still, seventy years after the fact, the 
Nuremberg-era’s legacy towards holding corporations legally 
accountable for participation in grave violations of international law  
 
 6.  See Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in 
Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern 
Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 119, 129 (2010) (demonstrating that despite 
the precedent established by courts and tribunals holding corporations accountable 
for their egregious behaviour, decisions have found corporations to be outside the 
reach of customary international laws). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Robert Cryer, International Criminal Justice in Historical Context: The 
Post-Second World War Trials and Modern International Criminal Justice, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGITIMACY AND COHERENCE 145, 146-47 
(Gideon Boas et al. eds., 2012). 
 9.  Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in 
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
1094, 1104 (2009); see also Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg Legacy Continues: The 
Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 343-44 (2008). 
 10.  See ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND COMMENTARY 27 (2011) (conveying that the IMT’s jurisdictional power is 
threefold and includes crimes against peace, war crimes, and humanity).  
 11.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1800, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1800 (Feb. 20, 2008); 
GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 509 (3d ed. 2014); ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 584 (2d ed. 2010); STEVEN 
RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 16-17 (3d ed. 2009).  
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remains at the centre of the contemporary debate, yet mired in 
confusion.12 
After outlining the significance of this enquiry to the present-day 
in Part II, Part III of the article briefly recaps the history of major 
German corporate defendants at the Nuremberg trials, both the IMT, 
conducted by the four Allied Powers, and the “Subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials” conducted by U.S. authorities, established at 
Nuremberg in the post-World War II period. Part IV deploys two 
jurisprudential lenses, the judicial and the legal, to seek to understand 
how today’s learned jurists and scholars of international law could 
have such diametrically opposed understandings of the same 
historical moment. With the intent of provoking further debate on 
Nuremberg’s legacy in this regard, the article also elaborates upon a 
third socio-legal lens, which questions whether accountability for 
German corporations, or their leaders, was achieved at all. Part V 
reviews developments within ICL since Nuremberg to grapple with 
corporate criminality to identify whether one lens has gained the 
ascendancy. Ultimately, the article concludes that comprehending the 
Nuremberg-era’s treatment of German corporations through the 
judicial-lens tends to dominate the positive law of ICL currently, 
denying corporate liability.  However the discernible trend towards 
incorporating corporations into the international legal order is 
suggestive of the future prominence of the legal-lens, prompting 
formal recognition of direct liability of corporations for serious 
violations of international law. 
II. CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF 
NUREMBERG 
Clarifying Nuremberg’s legacy in this regard is no mere historical 
exercise; its currency endures. Generally, Nuremberg’s legacy It has 
significant implications for contemporary conceptions of transitional 
justice and the effectiveness of international governance, generally.. 
Whether this legacy affects The dispute as to Nuremberg;s legacy on 
the potential for tribunals to hold corporations responsible for 
commission or complicity in international crimes informs today’s 
 12.  Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability 
(May 17, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the London School of 
Economics). 
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judicial decisions on the topic and is at the centre of the general 
debate about whether international law can and should be applied to 
corporations.13 
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IS AT ISSUE 
The issue of corporate accountability is bound with the broader 
challenge of maintaining the effectiveness of the international legal 
order, and, in particular, the protection of human rights in an 
increasingly globalized world. International law has failed to adapt 
from yesteryear’s international community of sovereign States to the 
globalized, multi-layered networked society we experience today.14 
The shift in power from States to non-State actors, such as 
corporations, requires an integration of these non-State actors into 
the international legal order for it to remain relevant and fulfil its 
objectives.15 Proponents of corporate accountability argue that the 
system must respond to the growing economic and political influence 
of the modern-day trans-national corporation.16 Just as international 
 13.  Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human 
Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
227, 230-31 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); PORTMANN, supra note 3, at 19; A.A. 
Fatouros, Introduction: Looking for an International Legal Framework for 
Transnational Corporations, in 20 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1, 2 (A.A. Fatouros & John H. Dunning eds., 
1994); Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, Introduction: Non-State Actors: 
International Law’s Problematic Case, in NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Math Noortman & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2010).  
 14.  See Keohane, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing that significant accountability 
gaps prevent many organizations from being held accountable by international 
law). 
 15.  Philip Alston, The Myopia of Handmaidens: International Lawyers and 
Globalization, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 435, 436-37 (1997); Sarah Joseph, Taming the 
Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, 46 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 
171, 186 (1999) [hereinafter Joseph, Taming the Leviathans]; Robert 
McCorquodale, Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 97, 114 (Sarah 
Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010); Andrew Clapham, Extending International 
Criminal Law Beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition 
Groups, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 899, 926 (2008); Larry Catá Backer, Multinational 
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 361 
(2006).   
 16.  Keohane, supra note 12, at 20-21. 
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law stands to constrain the raw power of States17 (e.g., in the realm 
of human rights protections), similar constraints should exist on 
corporate power. 
Corporations—especially large trans-nationals—enjoy many 
benefits arising out of the globalised, pluralistic legal environment in 
which they operate.18 They possess some rights,19 have sued 
sovereign States,20 and already play a significant role in “developing, 
communicating and entrenching” international law norms.21 A 
growing body of scholarship and international legal instruments 
suggest that alongside the rights and benefits that many transnational 
corporations (“TNCs”) now enjoy under the international legal order 
are international legal duties to abide by core human rights and 
humanitarian law standards.22 
 17.  Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, Sources of Customary International 
Law, in 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES § 9.2, at 1. 
 18.  JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 77 (2006); SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 1-4 (2004) (emphasizing that TNCs profit by 
operating in areas of civil unrest, use their abundant power to influence 
governments to adopt policies that benefit their objectives, and employ local army 
divisions for both security and to act against their corporate competitors). 
 19.  See John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global, in TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION 93, 106 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003); 
Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law: 
Creating “Soft Law” Obligations and “Hard Law” Rights, in NON-STATE ACTOR 
DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 30-31 (Math Noortman & Cedric Ryngaert 
eds., 2010) (conveying that non-state actors benefit from recognition under 
international treaties and have enforceable rights under international law). 
 20.  See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
43 (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2010) (referencing Shot v. Iran, U.S. CTR 
230, 218 (1990), where a tribunal declined to protect a corporation that violated the 
internal laws of its host state through illegally purchasing shares); Muchlinski, 
supra note 19, at 32 (describing a claim ultimately withdrawn against the Republic 
of South Africa brought by Italian mining investors who argued their investment 
was expropriated as a result of South Africa’s post-apartheid equal opportunity and 
land rights policy); Bismuth, supra note 1, at 217 (indicating that Bosphorus 
instituted proceedings in Ireland against Bosnia-Herzegovina).   
 21.  MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 212 (1998); see also Steven 
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE L.J. 443, 461 (2001) (arguing that the extensive power corporations exert 
over individuals and governments influences international affairs).  
 22.  Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power 
Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 
415 (2005); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, 
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Scholars have also argued that the integrity of ICL demands 
recognition of corporate liability for gross human rights violations. 
Whilst individual responsibility may well be a “cornerstone” of 
international criminal law, upon closer inspection, this body of law 
deals with crimes that require a plurality of actors for their 
commission.23 Genocide, war-crimes, and crimes against humanity 
all contemplate collective action.24 Koskenniemi observes that 
“sometimes a tragedy may be so great, a series of events of such 
political or even metaphysical significance, that punishing an 
individual does not come close to measuring up to it.”25 Nollkaemper 
and Van Der Wilt contend that individual responsibility for 
international crimes “is only a partial solution, and one which does 
not always take away the need to address the larger entities of which 
individuals are a part.”26 Recognition of corporate criminality would 
go some way to alleviate the shortcomings of ICL these scholars 
have identified. 
B. IMPACT ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The past few decades have seen an increase in the practice of 
“transitional justice litigation.” Practically, victims of corporate 
human rights abuses—many recovering from or still enduring armed 
PROCESS 215 (3d ed. 2010); Muchlinski, supra note 19, at 24-25; STEPHEN TULLY, 
CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 107 (2007).   
 23.  WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 11, at 36; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 189-191 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (arguing 
that appropriate implementation of the statute requires that it extend to all actors 
who contribute to violations of international humanitarian law regardless of 
whether such involvement is direct or indirect).  
 24.  Gerry Simpson, Men and Abstract Entities, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69, 76-77 (Harmen Van Der Wilt & André Nollkaemper 
eds., 2009).  
 25.  Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, in 6 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 1, 2 (2002); see also 2 INT’L. 
COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 1, 56 (2008), http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-
2008.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES]. 
 26.  André Nollkaemper, Introduction, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (Harmen Van Der Wilt & André Nollkaemper eds., 
2009). 
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conflict—have increasingly pursued civil lawsuits against their 
alleged abusers in domestic courts around the globe, alleging 
violations of core international legal standards.27 For example, 
privately-launched lawsuits (brought in various countries) have 
targeted  transnational corporations, such as Caterpillar, Veolia, and 
Alstom, alleging violations of international human rights law due to 
their continued operations with Israeli partners in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.28 
However, the relevance of corporate liability for international 
crimes to contemporary transitional justice efforts is most 
prominently evinced in the spate of Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) cases 
launched against transnational corporate defendants, which have 
wound their way into the U.S. court system. 29 These multi-million 
dollar lawsuits assert the violation of the law of nations and revolve 
around allegations of corporate commission and/or complicity in war 
crimes and serious human rights violations committed in developing 
countries.30 Since the mid-1990s, victims have filed scores of ATS 
suits against U.S. and non-U.S.-based transnational corporations 
alleging gross human rights abuses in dozens of countries; courts 
have deployed the ATS as an innovative transitional justice 
mechanism.31 ATS lawsuits offer abuse victims their day in court, a 
 27.  See RUTI G. TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 7 (2014); 
Jonathan Kolieb, Case Note, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell: A Challenge For 
Transnational Justice, 16 MACQUARIE L.J. 169, 170 (2014) (discussing the 
effective use of the Alien Tort Statute as an instrument of transitional justice). 
 28.  Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023-28 (W.D. Wash. 
2005); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, May 30, 2011, No 
11/05331, (Fr.).   
 29.  Alien Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2015). 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  See Jeremy Sarkin & Carly F. Westerman, Reparation for Historical 
Human Rights Violations: The International and Historical Dimensions of the 
Alien Torts Claims Act Genocide Case of the Herero of Namibia, 9 HUM. RTS. 
REV. 331, 356-58 (2008) (noting the unprecedented level of attention given to 
providing reparations for past human rights violations); Jérémie Gilbert, Corporate 
Accountability and Indigenous Peoples: Prospects and Limitations of the U.S. 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 25, 27 (2012) 
(underscoring the global impact the ATCA provides when applied to prosecute 
corporations responsible for human rights violations); Eric A. Posner, The Alien 
Tort Claims Act Under Attack, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 56-57 (2004); Kolieb, 
supra note 27, at 169-170 (explaining that the ATS became one of the most 
powerful tools for victims to pursue justice). 
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judicial adjudication of the conduct in dispute, and potential 
reparations to victims for harm caused – key objectives of 
transitional justice.32 Indeed, the ATS became the premier legal 
pathway for victims from around the world to seek accountability for 
corporate human rights abuses.33  For instance, ATS cases have 
included claims relating to corporate human rights violations in 
conflict-affected countries such as Colombia, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Indonesia, and Myanmar.34 
C. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE 
The divergence in understanding corporate accountability for 
international crimes has played out most prominently in ATS cases. 
Incredibly, the legacy of Nuremberg is frequently invoked in ATS 
cases in the United States to justify and deny corporate liability for 
international human rights abuses.35 
 32.  Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework 
for Understanding Transnational Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 95 (2002); 
David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and Mass Atrocities: Revisiting Transitional 
Justice, 13 INT’L STUD. REV. 85, 90 (2011); What is Transitional Justice?: A 
Backgrounder (Feb. 20, 2008), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_
2008_background_note.pdf; Helen Chang Mack & Mónica Segura Leonardo, 
Editorial Note: When Transitional Justice Is Not Enough, 6 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. 2, 5 (2012); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: 
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91 (1998); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice As Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 762, 766 (2003). 
 33.  Kadic v. Karadzić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding subject-matter 
jurisdiction exists to determine whether the tribunal can hold the leader of the self-
proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity that were carried out while he served as a state actor).  
 34.  Alien Tort Statute, U.S.A. ENGAGE, http://www. 
http://usaengage.org/Issues/Litigation/Alien-Tort-Statute-/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2015). 
 35.  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the lower court should have found subject matter jurisdiction for the 
plaintiffs’ claims against this international mining corporation accused of 
committing environmental devastation, war crimes, racial discrimination, and 
crimes against humanity); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 
2002) (declining to apply the Nuremberg reasoning and holding that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged violations of the law of nations pursuant to ATS); Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petrol. Corp., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to find 
corporate liability); South African Apartheid Litigation v. Citigroup, Inc., 346 F. 
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In 2010, for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
unanimously dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum (Shell).36  However, the justices fiercely disagreed 
as to the reasoning for dismissing the claims against the oil-and-gas 
giant, finding that the company was complicit in severe human rights 
abuses in the Niger Delta, including the extrajudicial trial37 and the 
torture and execution of local community leaders.38 
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Carbanes held that since 
corporations cannot be liable for international crimes under 
international law, they could not be held accountable under the ATS 
cause of action.39 In a separate opinion, the third judge, Justice Leval, 
attacked the judicial logic of the majority decision.40 He suggested 
that the majority’s argument was “illogical, misguided, and based on 
misunderstandings of precedent.”41 Curiously, both judicial opinions 
based their reasoning on interpretations of Nuremberg-era 
jurisprudence. 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorari for Kiobel specifically 
to address culpability.42 Many international legal scholars, as well as 
U.S. judges, were eager to have the highest U.S. court issue a final 
determination on the matter. The Kiobel case was one of the most 
anticipated cases on a crowded 2013 Supreme Court docket. Its 
practical consequences would impact billions of dollars pertaining to 
present and future ATS claims; human rights victims and 
Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the defendant did not engage in 
state action under the ATS); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (justifying corporate liability by 
holding adequate evidence existed to support allegations that defendant was 
responsible for serious human rights abuses). 
 36.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150; Kiobel Case: U.S. Supreme Court Review of Alien 
Tort Claim, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/corporate-legal-accountability/special-issues/kiobel-case-us-
supreme-court-review-of-alien-tort-claims-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).   
 37.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115-196. 
 38.  Id.; Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y 
TIMES, June 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell. 
html.  
 39.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120. 
 40.  Id. at 149-96.  
 41.  Id. at 151. 
 42.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog. 
com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
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corporations alike would feel its impact. Its jurisprudential 
implications would have been no less noteworthy because the highest 
U.S. court—a court held in high regard internationally—43 would 
weigh in on a particularly vexing area of international law to decide 
whether corporations could be held liable for international crimes. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately left the issue 
unaddressed.44 Instead, the Justices opted to decide the case on other 
jurisdictional grounds, leaving the international community in the 
dark as to whether corporations were liable for “violations of the law 
of nations.”45 
In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court determination, this article 
returns to an examination of Nuremberg-era jurisprudence in an 
effort to gain clarity on the matter of corporate liability for 
international crimes. This article seeks, in part, to explain the 
paradoxical judgments issued by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and it questions how is it possible that seventy years after 
this epoch-changing moment in international law, the Nuremberg 
legacy regarding corporate liability is so disputed and confused to the 
extent that eminent justices, legal scholars, and practitioners have 
such differing views as to what it stands for. 
The Second Circuit’s Kiobel judgment reflects what this article 
terms as the judicial and the legal lenses through which one can view 
Nuremberg’s treatment of German corporations. Both are focussed 
on the law, and vary only in aperture and what is meant when 
referring to Nuremberg-era jurisprudence. That is, does one look 
exclusively at the judicial verdicts issued in the courtrooms of 
Nuremberg, or is a more expansive view of the justice meted out to 
German corporate giants in the post-War period appropriate?46 
 43.  Court Role and Structure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
 44.  See John Bellinger, Stop Press: Supreme Court Orders Kiobel Reargued to 
Address Extraterritoriality, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:03 PM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/stop-press-supreme-court-orders-kiobel-reargued-address-
extraterritoriality (highlighting that questions posed by Justices Kennedy, Roberts, 
and Alito at oral arguments focused on jurisdiction, rather than on corporate 
liability). 
 45.  Ralph Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk 
for a Short Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 844 (2013). 
 46.  Quincy Wright, Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials, 69 HARV. 
L. REV. 964, 965 (1956). 
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Seemingly, whether one views Nuremberg as standing for or against 
corporate accountability for international human rights and 
humanitarian law violations rests largely on which historical lens is 
employed to view the law’s role during the Nuremberg-era. 
III. CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AT NUREMBERG: 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
From the outset, there was strong determination among the Allied 
Powers47 to prosecute German industrialists alongside the Third 
Reich’s military and political leaders at Nuremberg.48 The Allied 
Powers intended to include representatives of German industries in 
the exemplary justice meted out by the IMT.49 Included on the 
original list of the defendants in the first (and only) trial before the 
IMT was Gustav Krupp, who ran the Krupp AG, a heavy industry 
conglomerate of companies from 1909 until 1941.50 Krupp was 
instrumental in the rearmament of Germany in the inter-war years 
and the creation of the Nazi war-machine.51 
Due to ill-health (senility, partial paralysis, and old age), the 
Tribunal granted Krupp permission to forego trial, believing he was 
mentally and physically incapable of defending himself.52 
Prosecutors had hoped to replace Gustav Krupp on the docket with 
his son, Alfred Krupp who had taken over the running of the Krupp 
industrial conglomerate from his father in 1941.53 However, the 
 47.  Id. at 967. 
 48.  Id. at 964.  
 49.  THE KRUPP CASE (1948), reprinted in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1 (1950) [hereinafter KRUPP 
CASE]. 
 50.  C.N. Trueman, Gustav Krupp, THE HISTORY LEARNING SITE, 
historylearningsite.co.uk (last visited Oct. 26, 2015); C. Peter Chen, Gustav Krupp, 
WORLD WAR II DATABASE, http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=318 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015).  
 51.  See, e.g., International Military Tribunal: The Defendants, U.S. 
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article. 
php?ModuleId=10007070 (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (noting the use of forced 
labor contributed to the success of Krupp’s firm during the war). 
 52.  Id.; International Military Tribunal for Germany, Order of the Tribunal 
Granting Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen, 
AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-15.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015) [hereinafter Order Granting Postponement].  
 53.  International Military Tribunal for Germany, Supplemental Memorandum 
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judges of the IMT refused to allow the proposed substitution, and, so, 
the now-famous IMT Trial of Nazi War Criminals proceeded without 
a German industry representative amongst the defendants.54 
The Allies’ original plan for Nuremberg called for a second trial 
within the IMT,55 and the Allie’ intended to have a substantial 
number of defendants from German industry.56 Yet due to the 
nascent Cold War, this never happened.57 In particular, the Western 
powers feared the propaganda coup a second trial featuring German 
industries might provide to the Soviet Union.58 As Chief U.S. 
Prosecutor, Jackson wrote in a diplomatic memo directed to U.S. 
President Truman in 1946: 
I also have some misgivings as to whether a long public attack 
concentrated on private industry would not tend to discourage industrial 
cooperation with our Government in maintaining its defences in the future 
while not at all weakening in the Soviet position, since they do not rely 
upon private enterprise.59 
The IMT ended without prosecuting a single German 
industrialist.60 That task passed to the subsequent trials each of the 
Allies held in their respective zones of Occupied Germany.61 The 
United States was the most vigorous of the Great Powers and was 
intent on prosecuting and punishing the Nazi leadership through 
judicial trials.62 The United States intended to hold dozens of follow-
of the French Prosecution, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-
14.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2015).   
 54.  Order Granting Postponement, supra note 52. 
 55.  International Military Tribunal for Germany, Preliminary Hearing, 
Wednesday, 14 November, 1945: Morning Session, AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-14-45.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); KEVIN JON 
HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2011). 
 56.  See HELLER, supra note 55, at 21 (explaining that proposed defendants 
included those who had raised money for the Nazis and played significant roles in 
Germany’s rearmament).  
 57.  Id. at 24. 
 58.  Id. at 21. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 24.  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 1-2, 9-25 (explaining that the subsequent 
tribunals convicted 142 out of 147 defendants which represented “all important 
segments of the Third Reich”). 
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up trials.63 Ultimately, this ambitious plan was reduced to twelve 
trials that have become known as the “Subsequent Nuremberg 
Trials.”64 These trials were held at the Palace of Justice in 
Nuremburg, the venue of the IMT, yet convened exclusively by the 
United States.65 The panels of judges, lawyers, and trial staff were 
drawn from the U.S. legal system.66 
A. THE “INDUSTRIALIST TRIALS” 
Despite reticence and outright protest from some within the Chief 
of Counsel for War Crimes Office and within U.S. political circles 
against targeting German industrialists,67 three out of the twelve 
subsequent trials targeted German industrialists.68 Some of the 
bastions of German industry,69 and scores of German corporate 
executives and directors who were intimately involved in aiding and 
abetting the Nazi war machine70 were put on the docket.71 Additional 
planned prosecutions targeted large German banks and insurance 
companies that served to underwrite the war, but those never took 
place.72 
The Flick, Krupp, and Farben trials, named after the 
conglomerates from which the defendants were employees and/or 
executives, collectively became known as the “Industrialist Trials.”73 
 63.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 12. 
 64.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 1; Grietje Baars, Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? 
The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII, in THE 
HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 163 (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry 
Simpson eds., 2013). 
 65.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 163,168; KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 2. 
 66.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 67.  TOM BOWER, BLIND EYE TO MURDER: BRITAIN, AMERICA AND THE 
PURGING OF NAZI GERMANY - A PLEDGE BETRAYED 278 (1981). 
 68.  THE FLICK CASE (1948), reprinted in WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, 3 (1952) [hereinafter FLICK CASE]; THE I.G. 
FARBEN CASE (1948), reprinted in 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1 (1953) [hereinafter I.G. FARBEN CASE]; see 
also KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1. 
 69.  S. Jonathan Wiesen, German Industry and the Third Reich: Fifty Years of 
Forgetting and Remembering, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE’S BRAUN HOLOCAUST 
INSTITUTE, http://archive.adl.org/braun/dim_13_2_forgetting.html#.Vi5Kl7Rtv8E). 
 70.  I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 1-2.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  BOWER, supra note 67, at 18-21.  
 73.  FLICK CASE, supra note 68, at 3; I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 1; 
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These trials represented the first time in modern history where a 
judicial body considered the cases of corporations and their agents 
committing war crimes and other violations of international law. 
Flick, Krupp, and Farben were targeted due to the Allies’ 
perception that each played a critical role in the German arms and 
related industries that were crucial to the Nazi arms build up and 
execution of their war plans.74 Both cases dealt with heavy 
industries. The Flick Concern included coal mines and steel plants, 
while the Krupp Group included steel and armaments factories.75 
I.G. Farben was, at the time, the world’s largest business 
conglomerate that had a diverse range of commercial interests, and 
most prominent was the dominant chemical company of its day.76 Of 
its exploits, Farben was most infamous for its development of 
synthetic nitrate, which allowed the German military to become 
independent of foreign sources. Farben was also infamous for its 
invention and manufacture of Zyklon B, the poison gas used in the 
Auschwitz gas-chambers.77 Indeed, Farben epitomized the intimate 
role German industry held in the Nazi rise to power and its 
murderous war effort. For example, the series of camps constructed 
at Auschwitz did not only include Auschwitz I and II-Birkenau (the 
concentration and extermination camps),78 but Auschwitz III-Buna—
a massive complex of Farben factories that dwarfed the other two 
camps in size, and where the camps’ inmates were forced to work.79 
Not only did Farben benefit from the huge slave labor pool of the 
camps, but Farben scientists regularly used camp inmates in a series 
of macabre medical and chemical experiments.80 
In total, forty-two industrialists were tried at Nuremburg by U.S. 
authorities. The tribunal found twenty-seven of them guilty of 
various international crimes, including war-crimes and crimes 
KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1. 
 74.  FLICK CASE, supra note 68, at 3; I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 1-2; 
KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1-2. 
 75.  I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 16; KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 
1481. 
 76.  I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 16. 
 77.  1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93-94 (U.N. War Crimes 
Comm’n, ed., 1947).   
 78.  JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN 121 (1978). 
 79.  Id. at 120-21. 
 80.  Id. at 120-22. 
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against humanity, crimes which also included the use of slave-labor 
and the plundering and spoliation of occupied territories. 81 They 
were sentenced to prison terms ranging from one-and-a-half to 
twelve years in length.82 The tribunal sentenced Alfred Krupp, the 
owner and CEO of the Krupp Group, and the man considered most 
culpable83 to twelve years imprisonment and ordered to forfeit all of 
his real and personal property.84 These trials demonstrate that there is 
no impediment to direct application of ICL to corporate managers, 
directors, and executives.85 
IV. DIFFERENT LENSES TO EXPLAIN THE 
PRESENT-DAY DIVERGENCE 
These facts about the “Industrialist Cases” are well documented.86 
Nevertheless, successive generations of international law scholars, 
practitioners, and contemporary judges and tribunals keenly debate 
how the judgments in these cases and related decrees of the Allied 
Powers during the Nuremberg-era ought to be interpreted vis-a-vis 
corporate accountability for major human rights abuses.87 
This article suggests that there are two different lenses—the 
judicial and the legal—through which one can view the Nuremberg-
era’s treatment of German corporations. These labels are deliberately 
chosen, terms that are sometimes used interchangeably to indicate 
that whilst their jurisprudential views are different, it is a difference 
borne out of nothing more than aperture and focus. 
These interpretive lenses help explain the vigorous contemporary 
disagreements as to corporate liability under international law, such 
as that which appears in the Kiobel judgments.88 Whether 
contemporary scholars and jurists consider if Nuremberg stands for 
 81.  FLICK CASE, supra note 68, at 3; KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1-2. 
 82.  FLICK CASE, supra note 68, at 1228; KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1486; 
I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 1; HELLER, supra note 55, at 93-94. 
 83.  KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1486. 
 84.  KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1486; HELLER, supra note 55, at 101. 
 85.  Olga Martin-Ortega, Business Under Fire: Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights In Conflict Zones, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT 189, 201 (Noëlle Quénivet & Shilan Shah-Davis eds., 2010). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Corp., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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or against corporate liability seems largely to depend on how wide or 
narrow a jurisprudential lens through which the Nuremberg-era is 
historicized. 
A. THE NARROW JUDICIAL LENS 
If viewing the Nuremberg-era through a narrow, positivist lens, 
focussing on the judicial verdicts of Nuremberg from the IMT and 
subsequent trials, one could reasonably conclude that corporations 
cannot be liable, as a rule for international crimes.89 Adherents of this 
view invariably commence their argument point to one of the most 
frequently cited passages in the IMT judgment, which seemingly 
supports this understanding of Nuremberg’s jurisprudence and states: 
“[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”90 
This famous sentence drawn from the IMT judgment suggests that 
the law, as enforced at Nuremberg, focused exclusively on individual 
liability, rather than imputing any responsibility to corporations (or 
other collective organizations).91 As one U.S. jurist noted, this 
statement means that “liability under the law of nations . . . could not 
be divorced from individual moral responsibility.”92 Indeed, 
individual responsibility is a core principle of international criminal 
law, as it has developed in the decades since Nuremberg.93 
Employing this narrow, judicial lens, the fact that no corporation 
was put on the docket for crimes and no corporation was punished by 
the judicial decisions of the Nuremberg trials is determinative.94 
Moreover, adherents of this view also point out that no German 
company was declared a “criminal organisation” by the IMT, despite 
 89.  Id. at 147 (holding “corporate liability is not a norm that we can recognize 
and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of 
human rights does not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, 
or otherwise)”).  
 90.  Nürnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (IMT 1946). 
 91.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145-48. 
 92.  Id. at 135. 
 93.  WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 11, at 509 (asserting that the collective 
nature of violations of international law does not abate the need to assign 
individual responsibility to all contributors); CASSESE ET AL., supra note 10, at 15 
(noting that punishing violators is key to criminal international law). 
 94.  CASSESE ET AL., supra note 10, at 15. 
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its clear authority to do so under article 9 of the London Charter.95 
The executives of the major German industrial giants were 
prosecuted and found guilty of war crimes and imprisoned, but the 
corporations themselves escaped judicial accountability.96 Scholars 
denying the applicability of international criminal law to 
corporations suggest this indicates that Nuremberg stands for 
individual culpability, not corporate or State culpability.97 
This is a straightforward, formalistic reading of Nuremberg’s 
legacy. Put simply, the fact that no corporations were in the docket is 
evidence that ICL is not applicable to collective entities, such as 
corporations.98 This reading confirms that ICL is concerned with 
individual criminal responsibility exclusively. 
Whilst articles 9 and 10 of the London Charter include the concept 
of “criminal organisations”—and some organizations were found to 
be criminal (e.g. the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, Gestapo, 
SD, SS99)—Spiropoulos explains there was “no penal sanction to the 
declaration of [organisational] criminality . . . [n]o responsibility of 
the organization was established.”100 Spiropoulos also adds that 
“municipal laws, with rare exceptions, do not establish the penal 
responsibility of legal persons.”101 The International Law 
Commission, in its commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind held that individual responsibility 
 95.  CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1945), reprinted 
in 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10, 12 (1947) (Article 9 states “[a]t the 
trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may 
declare (in connection with any act of which the Individual may be convicted) that 
the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal 
organization.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., BORKIN, supra note 78, at 158 (observing that after Eisenhower’s 
recommendations about I.G. Farben were made public, the shares of I.G. Farben 
doubled on the Munich stock exchange). 
 97.  Brief for Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.-Ilya Shapiro et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, at 26, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491) (arguing that the “Nuremberg Charter did not provide for 
jurisdiction to hear claims against corporations”). 
 98.  Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind – 
Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25/1950 [hereinafter Spiropoulos Report].  
 99.  RATNER, supra note 11, at 16, 17. 
 100.  Spiropoulos Report, supra note 98, at 260.  
 101.  Id. at 261. 
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is the “cornerstone” of international criminal law.102 This approach 
was affirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) in its 1997 Tadic103 decision, where the tribunal stated that 
“no one may be held answerable for acts or omissions of 
organizations to which he belongs, unless he bears personal 
responsibility for a particular act, conduct or omission.”104 
B. THE BROADER LEGAL LENS 
However, this narrow reading of Nuremberg’s treatment of 
German corporations which actively participated in the Nazi war-
effort does not go unchallenged.105 In fact, if the jurisprudential gaze 
with which one views Nuremberg is broadened one could reasonably 
conclude that the criminality of German corporations was recognised 
and they were punished for their crimes. Taking this approach, one 
concludes that Nuremberg “recognized that corporations had 
obligations under international law (and were therefore subjects of 
international law)” and acknowledges the applicability of 
international criminal law to corporations.106 
This legal lens encourages one to look beyond the absence of a 
corporation in the docket at Nuremberg and examine the content of 
decisions handed down at the Nuremberg tribunals. It also 
encompasses the treatment of German corporations by the array of 
Allied authorities, both judicial and otherwise, exercising legal 
functions in the immediate post-War period.107 
 102.  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Eigth Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fifty-First Session, Supplement No.10, [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/51/10 [hereinafter Forty-Eighth Session Report]. 
 103.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/ 
tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
 104.  Id. at 95 (distinguishing that for joint criminal enterprises, individuals must 
have a nexus to the group to be criminally liable); CASSESE ET AL., supra note 10, 
at 137.  
 105.  Brief for Kiobel-Omer Bartov et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1154 [hereinafter Bartov Amicus Brief]. 
 106.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Corp., 621 F.3d 111, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 107.  BORKIN, supra note 96, at 160 (noting that the big three’s stock, combined, 
represented over fifteen percent of the value of all stock on the West German stock 
exchange). 
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The legal lens highlights that the basis upon which several 
individual industrialists were found guilty of international crimes 
was due to their participation in the criminal conduct of corporations 
such as I.G. Farben.108 Justice Leval observed when examining this 
very issue in the Kiobel ATS case that: “[i]n at least three of those 
trials, tribunals found that corporations violated the law of nations 
and imposed judgment on individual criminal defendants based on 
their complicity in the corporations’ violations.”109 
The legal reasoning of the tribunals in the Industrialist Cases was a 
two-step process. For example, in the I.G. Farben Trial, the Tribunal 
concluded that Farben had violated international law and then 
imposed liability on individual Farben executives and employees 
based on their complicity in Farben’s violations.110 Thus, whilst none 
of the companies were formally declared “criminal organisations” at 
Nuremberg, nor were they subject to the jurisdiction of the IMT or 
zonal trials, the judgments in the Industrialist Trials suggest the 
possibility of attributing liability for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity to the companies themselves, not just their directors or 
employees.111 For example, in Krupp, the Tribunal repeatedly 
referred to the collective intent of the Krupp Group, and noted the 
firm’s “ardent desire” to employ slave labor in its factories.112 
Similarly, the Farben case implicated the conglomerate itself in the 
crimes perpetrated in its name.113 
Several passages from the Farben trial judgment support this 
interpretation. The Tribunal determined that Farben, as a corporate 
entity, had directly violated the “Laws and Customs of War” of the 
Hague Regulations (1907) through its use of slave labor at Auschwitz and 
elsewhere, and found that it had been involved in war crimes and crimes 
 108.  See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to 
Rangoon: An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the 
Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 106 (2002); 
Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 665, 676 (2006).  
 109.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 180 (Leval, J. concurring). 
 110.  Id. at 149.   
 111.  See Ramasastry, supra note 108, at 112. 
 112.  KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1440. 
 113.  I.G. FARBEN CASE, supra note 68, at 1132-33 (stating, during direct 
examination, that the “prosecution charges I.G. Farben . . . on its own initiative 
prepared mobilization plans, air-raid precautions, and air-defense measures.”) 
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against humanity.114 The Tribunal stated “[w]here private individuals, 
including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by 
acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former 
owner, such action not being expressly justified by any applicable 
provision of the Hague Regulations, is in violation of international 
law.”115 
Describing Farben’s activities, the judgment determination was 
clear: 
[W]e find that the proof establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that 
offenses against property as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 were 
committed by Farben, and that these offenses were connected with, and an 
inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries as above 
described . . . [t]he action of Farben and its representatives, under these 
circumstances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder or pillage 
committed by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German 
Reich.116 
Establishing individual defendants’ guilt through evidence of Farben’s 
international law violations was a major legal argument accepted by the 
tribunal.117 Proving the conglomerate’s liability for grave violations of 
international law led to the convictions of the responsible individual 
directors and managers in the dock at Nuremberg.118 As Engle observes, 
these German corporations were implicated in the crimes of their 
directors, and vice versa.119 The judgment in the Farben case makes clear 
that: 
[w]hile the Farben organisation, as a corporation, is not charged under the 
indictment with committing a crime and is not the subject of prosecution 
 114.  Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to 
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The 
Hague, Oct. 18 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 90 (Supp.). 
 115.  THE I.G. FARBEN CASE (1948), reprinted in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1, 1132 (1952) [hereinafter I.G. 
FARBEN CASE VOL. 8]. 
 116.  Id. at 1140. 
 117.  See id. at 1108 (finding that to hold defendants guilty “on the ground that 
they participated in the planning, preparation, and initiation of wars of aggression 
or invasions . . . requires a consideration of basic facts” including “their positions 
and activities with or in behalf of Farben.”) 
 118.  Id. at 1107. 
 119.  Eric Engle, Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for 
Human Rights Violations?, 20 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 287, 291-92 (2006). 
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in this case, it is the theory of the prosecution that the defendants 
individually and collectively used the Farben organisation as an 
instrument by and through which they committed the crime enumerated in 
the indictment.120 
The Tribunal went on to condemn the crimes of Farben and its 
representatives, condemning not only the corporation’s 
representatives, but the corporate entity itself.121 Similarly, in the 
Krupp trial, the tribunal’s judgment referred to actions by the 
company, not simply the actions of individual managers or 
employees when the tribunal concluded “that it has been clearly 
established by credible evidence that from 1942 onward illegal acts 
of spoliation and plunder were committed by, and on behalf of, the 
Krupp firm.”122 
C. “MEN” AND “ABSTRACT ENTITIES” 
Adherents to this broader understanding of Nuremberg’s treatment of 
corporate liability for international crimes suggest that the IMT’s classic 
statement, that “crimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities” is decontextualized and, as a result, entirely 
misconstrued by those adhering to the narrower, “judicial” 
interpretation.123  Rather than an attempt by the IMT to constrain the 
scope of international criminal law to individuals, it was intended to have 
precisely the opposite effect. 
Reflecting the traditional conception of international law, the Nazi 
defendants who were standing trial before the IMT argued that 
“international law is concerned with the action of sovereign States, and 
provides no punishment for individuals.”124 The IMT explicitly rejected 
the defendants’ argument by affirming that “international law imposes 
duties and liabilities on individuals as well as upon States.”125 With this in 
 120.  THE I.G. FARBEN CASE VOL. 8, supra note 115, at 1108. 
 121.  See id. at 1140 (holding that the offenses were committed by both Farben 
and its representatives, and the actions “cannot be differentiated from acts of 
plunder or pillage committed by officers, soldiers, or public officials of the 
German Reich”). 
 122.  KRUPP CASE, supra note 49, at 1370. 
 123.  Brief for Kiobel-Navi Pillay as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) 
[hereinafter Pillay Amicus Brief]. 
 124.  United States v. Goering, Judgment, 52 (Int’l Mil. Trib. Oct. 1, 1946). 
 125.  Id. 
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mind, the IMT’s classic dictum that crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities takes on an entirely different 
meaning. The statement was intended as a rejection of this position of 
impunity put forward by the individual defendants.126 The Tribunal was 
seeking to extend accountability under international law, not restrict it.127 
As the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, 
observed in an amicus curiae brief filed in the Kiobel ATS litigation, 
there is a parallel between the human defendants at Nuremberg, and the 
corporate defendants facing contemporary ATS suits for complicity in 
international crimes.128 In each, the defendants argue that the judges 
should not hold them liable under international law, since at the time 
neither party’s liability had attained the level of a “specific, universal and 
obligatory” customary international law norm.129 In pleading for a 
repudiation, Pillay points out that, if one accepts this judicial reasoning, 
then one must conclude the Nuremberg trials themselves were based on 
an invalid expansion of international law.130 
Rejecting such a perverse outcome, Justice Leval of the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals sought to affirm corporate liability for 
international crimes in Kiobel.131 In his separate (but concurring) opinion, 
he states that: 
 
 126.  See id. (“. . . that international law imposes duties and liabilities upon 
individuals as well as upon states has long been recognized.”) 
 127.  Pillay Amicus Brief, supra note 123, at 19-20 (contending that the point of 
the Nuremberg dictum “was to reject an argument of impunity by extending 
accountability to the human defendants who claimed, like the corporate defendants 
in Kiobel, that they could not be held accountable under international law,” and not 
“to limit responsibility to natural persons alone”). 
 128.  Id. at 20 (contending that the impunity argument “advanced by the Second 
Circuit in Kiobel is remarkably similar to the argument that the IMT . . . rejected in 
the Nuremberg judgment.”).  
 129.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (explaining the so-
called “Sosa Test” as set forth in an earlier ATS case to determine what constitutes 
a “violations of the law of nations,” as per the Statute’s wording).   
 130.  Former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay stated in 
her amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court for the Kiobel case that:  
[G]eneral principles of law recognized by civilized nations are a source of 
international law that empowers the Court to . . . accept certain principles of law as 
governing their relations inter se, and to draw upon principles common to various 
systems . . . [to make] possible the expansion of international law.  
Pillay Amicus Brief, supra note 123, at 235-26 
 131.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Corp., 621 F.3d 111, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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If past judges had followed the majority’s reasoning [i.e., no recognition 
of corporate criminal liability under international law], we would have 
had no Nuremberg trials, which for the first time imposed criminal 
liability on natural persons complicit in war crimes; no subsequent 
international tribunals to impose criminal liability or violation of 
international law norms . . . .132 
In an attack on the majority’s decision in that case which centered 
around a denial of corporate liability for international crimes, Justice 
Leval incredulously suggested that if the majority’s reasoning stands, 
it in effect creates an absurd new legal rule: 
The new rule offers to unscrupulous businesses advantages of 
incorporation never before dreamed of. So long as they incorporate (or act 
in the form of a trust), businesses will now be free to trade in or exploit 
slaves, employ mercenary armies to do dirty work for despots, perform 
genocides or operate torture prisons for a despot’s political opponents, or 
engage in piracy — all without civil liability to victims. By adopting the 
corporate form, such an enterprise could have hired itself out to operate 
Nazi extermination camps or the torture chambers of Argentina’s dirty 
war, immune from civil liability to its victims. By protecting profits 
earned through abuse of fundamental human rights protected by 
international law, the rule my colleagues have created operates in 
opposition to the objective of international law to protect those rights.133 
Thus, emphasizing these elements of the Nuremberg-era judgements, 
the Industrialist Trials held in the U.S. zone at Nuremberg evinces “the 
willingness of key legal actors to contemplate corporate responsibility at 
the international level.”134 Pillay argues that the legal treatment of these 
German companies supports “the proposition that corporations can and 
should be held accountable for violations of fundamental human rights 
norms.”135 Moreover, Engle views the trials’ legacy similarly, observing 
that Nuremberg is recognised as the moment and place when the 
“principle where corporations are capable of committed crimes under 
international law is revealed.”136 
 132.  Id. at 153. 
 133.  Id. at 153. 
 134.  RATNER, supra note 11, at 447. 
 135.  Pillay Amicus Brief, supra note 123, at 23. 
 136.  Engle, supra note 119, at 291-92. 
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D. LOOKING FOR LAW BEYOND THE COURTROOM 
Furthermore, the legal, as distinct from the judicial interpretation 
of Nuremberg’s legacy vis-a-vis corporate liability for international 
crimes also seeks to view the IMT as but one component of the post-
war legal order that oversaw Occupied Germany and punished the 
civil and military leadership of the Nazi regime, including leading 
German corporations. Beyond formal judicial penalty, the fate of the 
I.G. Farben conglomerate is illustrative of how German corporations 
were treated and punished by the victors of World War II.137 The 
Allied Powers established a regime to govern Germany in the immediate 
post-war period.138 The Allied Control Council, of which the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Russia were founding members with 
France, which joined the Council later, became the sovereign of occupied 
Germany, succeeding the Nazi state from which it had just accepted 
unconditional surrender.139 The international tribunals set up in 
Nuremberg to try Nazi leaders were established pursuant to Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10 issued on 20 December 1945.140 Weeks 
earlier, the Allied Control Council issued Allied Control Council Law No. 
9 of 30 November 1945 that seized the assets of I.G. Farben and 
dissolved it as a going concern for the express purpose of “ensur[ing] 
that Germany will never again threaten her neighbors or the peace of 
the world.”141 
 
 137.  See BORKIN, supra note 78, at 158. 
 138.  Agreement Between the Allies on Control Machinery in Germany, U.K.-
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 14, 1944. 
 139.  HELLER, supra note 55, at 114 (demonstrating the legal basis upon which 
the Allied Control Council exercised its authority has been a matter of long-
running disputes amongst legal scholars and historians). However, the argument 
that attracts the most support from scholars is that in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II, the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany to the Allies was an 
instance of the deballatio of Germany – “a situation in which victorious powers are 
entitled to assume absolute sovereignty over a state because its government, as a 
result of total military defeat, has ceased to exist.” Id.   
 140.  ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL NO. 9: PROVIDING FOR THE SEIZURE OF 
PROPERTY OWNED BY I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AND THE CONTROL THEREOF (1945), 
reprinted in 1 ENACTMENTS AND APPROVED PAPERS OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL 
AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE 225 (1946). 
 141.  LAW NO. 9: PROVIDING FOR THE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY OWNED BY I.G. 
FARBENINDUSTRIE AND THE CONTROL THEREOF (1945), reprinted in PROPERTY 
CONTROL: ANNEX XVIII 87 (1949).  
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Arguably, the law to dissolve Farben, seize its assets, and allow 
for reparations to victims from those assets is a decision of a legal, 
even penal, nature, and it forms part of Nuremberg-era jurisprudence. 
On this reading of history, therefore, the tribunal in Farben—the 
largest of the German conglomerates and the corporation perceived 
as the most complicit in the Nazi war machine—determined it was 
guilty of war crimes. Hence, Farben was punished by the same entity 
that created the IMT, and Farben received a penalty of the highest 
order for an entity unable to be incarcerated or executed: corporate 
capital punishment, or dissolution.142 As several Nuremberg legal 
scholars have noted: “[d]eath through seizure was as much a 
pronouncement of international law as Control Council Law No. 10 
which was used to prosecute natural persons and organizations.”143 It was 
understood that corporations would be punished for their complicity in 
Nazi crimes, even as their individual directors and managers would also 
be held to account through legal prosecution at Nuremberg.144 As Justice 
Rogers of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
observed in another ATS case against a transnational corporation, 
“the Allies determined that I.G. Farben had committed violations of 
the law of nations and therefore destroyed it.”145 Farben’s punishment 
was but one example, reflective of the treatment meted out to other 
German corporate giants through subsequent Allied Control Council laws 
and proclamations. Furthermore, Krupp and Flick were also the subjects 
of seizure orders and reparations orders.146 
 142.  BORKIN, supra note 78, at 158. 
 143.  Bartov Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at 22.  
 144.  Id. at 22. 
 145.  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 146.  See ALLIED CONTROL AUTHORITY CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 57: 
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES CONNECTED WITH THE 
GERMAN LABOUR FRONT (1947), reprinted in 8 ENACTMENTS AND APPROVED 
PAPERS OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE 1 (1947); 
LAW NO. 27: REORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN COAL AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 




d2b626b9ed0b.html; LAW NO. 52: BLOCKING AND CONTROL OF PROPERTY, in 
DENAZIFICATION: ANNEX H: MILITARY GOVERNMENT – GERMANY SUPREME 
COMMANDER’S AREA OF CONTROL 46 (1948); GENERAL ORDER NO. 3: PURSUANT 
TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT LAW NO. 52; BLOCKING AND CONTROL OF PROPERTY: 
BANK DER DEUTSCHEN ARBEIT A. G., in GERMANY MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
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Summing up the legal approach to viewing Nuremberg’s treatment of 
German corporations, several international criminal law scholars note, 
“Nuremberg era jurisprudence establishes, therefore, that not only States 
and natural persons can be liable for international law violations, but also 
juridical entities.”147 The same group of scholars reflect on the narrower 
judicial interpretation of that history and state that “to use Nuremberg era 
jurisprudence as a basis to immunize corporations from liability under 
international law, we contend, would be contrary to the underlying goals 
of this jurisprudence.”148 Pillay appeals to notions of fairness and 
effectiveness within the international legal order when arguing that, “[a] 
corporation cannot be permitted to commit genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes, given that every other participant on the plane 
of international law is prohibited from doing so.”149 
This argument, predicated on morality and fairness, is reminiscent of a 
Rawlsian conception of justice and finds support in the IMT judgment 
itself.150 In the main war-crimes trial, the defense put forward the 
argument of nullum crimen sine lege,151 arguing that the tribunal was 
trying the Nazi defendants for actions that were not crimes when they 
were committed and this was ex post facto justice that could not stand.152 
Explicitly rejecting the positivist position on the state of international law, 
the IMT took a ‘naturalistic approach’ to this issue by stating that nullum 
crimen was a principle not of law, but of justice, and as such could be set 
GAZETTE: UNITED STATES AREA OF CONTROL 32-33 (1949).  
 147.  Bartov Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at *13. 
 148.  Id. at *29. 
 149.  Pillay Amicus Brief, supra note 123, at 16; accord ZERK, supra note 18, at 
75-76; see also Celia Wells & Juanita Elias, Catching the Conscience of the King: 
Corporate Players on the International Stage, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 141, 150 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); INT’L. COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POL’Y, 
BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 12 (2002).   
 150.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999) (contending that 
justice and fairness are essential to the welfare of society and “institutions no 
matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust.”). 
 151.  WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 11, at 39 (discussing that nullum crimen 
sine lege “requires that the criminal conduct be laid down as clearly as possible in 
the definition of the crime.”). 
 152.  WERLE & JESSBERGER, supra note 11, at 39-40 (noting that nullum crimen 
sine lege bars retroactive punishment, and the IMT examined “the criminal nature 
of crimes against peace at the time the acts were committed.”). 
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aside if overridden by a higher-order principle of justice.153 The IMT 
stated that in instances where the “attacker must know that he is doing 
wrong, and so, far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if 
his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.”154  This naturalist argument 
also serves as a basis for supporting recognition of direct corporate 
liability for international crimes. 
E. A POSSIBLE THIRD LENS 
Aside from the two lenses, so far elucidated to make sense of the 
divergent views expressed by modern day scholars and jurists on the 
question of corporate liability for international crimes, it is also 
feasible to adopt a third lens through which to view the Nuremberg-
era’s legacy on the issue: the ‘socio-legal’ lens. Widening the 
aperture through  which to view Nuremberg’s legacy yet further than 
either the judicial or legal lenses previously discussed, to take in a 
larger historical perspective, one must be more circumspect that 
German corporations found complicit in the crimes of the Nazi state 
were held accountable at all.155 
Contrary to the judicial and legal lenses, employing a socio-legal 
perspective requires an examination of the “law in action” and not 
just the “law in the books.” The socio-legal lens permits us to look 
beyond the Allied Powers legal decrees through the Nuremberg’s 
trial judgments, to the actual social consequences of such legal and 
judicial action. A broader view of history calls into question whether 
genuine accountability for the German corporate giants found 
complicit in the crimes of the Nazi regime was accomplished at all, 
despite the scores of corporate executives being tried and found 
guilty of war-crimes and other crimes and despite the legal orders 
calling for the dissolution of the major German conglomerates and 
the seizure of their assets.156 According to this third socio-legal lens, 
at ICL’s seminal moment of Nuremberg, at the definitive moment of 
 153.  Cryer, supra note 8, at 155. 
 154.  United States v. Goering, Judgment, 49 (Int’l Mil. Trib. Oct. 1, 1946). 
 155.  See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 
25 (1910) (asserting that utilizing “Anglo-American common law as the basis from 
which to make logical deductions, the law in the books will more and more 
become an impossible attempt to govern the living by the dead.”). 
 156.  United States v. Goering, Order to Postpone Proceedings Against Gustav 
Krupp Von Bohlen, 1 (IMT Nov. 15, 1945). 
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punishing corporations for their involvement in some of the most 
heinous atrocities in history, accountability was ultimately not 
achieved. 
As noted earlier, the IMT never prosecuted any representatives of 
German industry.. Furthermore, whilst the combined legal decisions 
of the Allied Control Council and subsequent zonal trials punished 
the major German conglomerates and their executive leaderships, 
that punishment was, in real terms, minimal and short-lived.157 For 
example, the dissolution of I.G. Farben or other German companies 
never really occurred.158 In the three months after issuing Control 
Council No. 9 (which supposedly dissolved Farben and seized its 
assets), Farben’s stocks continued to be traded on the Munich Stock 
Exchange.159 Indeed, they doubled in value.160 Originally, the United 
States intended to split Farben into forty-seven smaller units.161 This 
never happened.162 By 1951, local German interests, and the evolving 
geo-political realities of the nascent Cold War, had succeeded in 
forcing the Allies to shelve that plan that would have considerably 
weakened Germany, which the Allies now could ill-afford.163 
Instead, Farben was divided into just three companies: Bayer, BASF, 
and Hoechst.164 Profits in the 1950s of each of these three firms 
quickly exceeded the profits of their predecessor I.G. Farben.165 
Thirty years after Nuremberg, all three were ranked in the thirty 
largest multi-national corporations in the world, each “bigger than 
I.G. Farben at its zenith.”166 
Moreover, in 1951, not three years after their sentences were 
handed down, almost all of the industrialists that were found guilty at 
Nuremburg had been released from jail.167 This was motivated by 
 157.  WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE ARMS OF KRUPP 681 (1968); BORKIN, supra 
note 78, at 162. 
 158.  BORKING, supra note 78, at 159. 
 159.  Id. at 158. 
 160.  Id. at 158. 
 161.  Id. at 159. 
 162.  Id. at 159. 
 163.  Id. at 159. 
 164.  BORKING, supra note 78, at 161. 
 165.  Id. at 162 
 166.  Id. at 163. 
 167.  MANCHESTER, supra note 157, at 687.  
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political expediency and the evolving geo-politics of the period.168 
Turning its attention from litigating the past war, the United States 
began to look ahead and was now focused on bolstering a German 
economy as a bulwark against the perceived rising “red threat” from 
the Soviet Union.169 Several of the guilty men even resumed their 
leadership of German industry. Alfred Krupp resumed control of his 
steel firm in 1953, and Fritz Ter Meer (the only war criminal 
convicted of both plunder and slavery for his role in Farben’s slave 
labor factories at Auschwitz) became chairman of the board of Bayer 
in 1956.170 
V. BEYOND NUREMBERG: CORPORATIONS 
BEFORE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
Subsequent international criminal jurisprudence and writings fail 
to evince a clear dominance of any one of these lenses, and, rather, 
seemingly perpetuates the confusion as to corporate liability for 
international crimes. Notably, in line with the judicial-lens’ 
understanding of Nuremberg’s legacy, the constitutive documents of 
the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and the International 
Criminal Court expressly grant jurisdiction to try only natural 
persons, not legal persons, i.e., corporations.171 Certainly, to date, 
none of these tribunals have prosecuted or criminalised a single 
corporate entity.172 However, as adherents to the legal-lens approach 
 168.  BOWER, supra note 67, at 364-66 (explaining that the imminence of the 
fight against communism led to the releases). Germans contended that helping the 
United States against communists would be easier if the Industrialists and 
convicted men in Landsberg prison were released. 
 169.  See Bush, supra note 9, at 1121 (“[b]y mid-1946, when decisions about 
war crimes for big business were being reached, most planners had concluded that 
political and economic stability could only be achieved with the participation of 
German industry run by the same managers, regardless of culpability.”).   
 170.  BORKIN, supra note 78, at 162. 
 171.  See G.A. Res. 827, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia 6 (May 25, 1993) (granting jurisdiction over natural 
persons); S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, (Aug. 8, 
1994) (granting jurisdiction over natural persons); Rome Statute, supra note 4, at 
17 (granting jurisdiction over natural persons).  
 172.  See generally All Cases, INT’L. CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/cases/Pages/cases%20index.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing all ICC cases); Status of Cases, INT’L. CRIM. 
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argue, the constitutive documents of these tribunals do not, 
necessarily define the extent of substantive law. Rather, they are 
instruments that extend their respective tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
certain subjects and/or geographic areas. The fact that corporations 
cannot be prosecuted at these tribunals is thus reduced to a 
procedural matter, rather than reflecting substantive legal 
principles.173 
Moreover, there is confusion in the literature as to why the 
proposal to include jurisdiction over “legal persons” in the text of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Rome Statute was ultimately 
left out. Some scholars cite substantive concerns with the proposal, 
while others suggest it was a matter of diplomatic expediency.174 
TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://41.220.139.198/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing the status of International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda cases); Judgement List, INT’L. CRIM. TRIB. FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10095 (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing all ICTY 
judgments). 
 173.  Brief for Kiobel-Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2746, *55 (arguing that corporations are not 
categorically incapable of violating international law, but procedurally individuals 
are held responsible). 
 174.  Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l. Crim. Ct., 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, 49 (July 17, 1998) [Report of the Prep. Comm.] 
(“[t]he Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons . . . 
when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons . . . 
[t]he criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal respons
ibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices . . . .”) [translated 
from French]; see also, Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in 1 THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 527, 
532-33 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (contending legal persons were left out 
because of the lack of a common approach between nations, which could affect the 
principle of complementarity); MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2013) (contending time running out and 
substantive divergence of States regarding corporate criminal responsibility were 
major factors); Andrew Clapham, The Complexity of International Criminal Law: 
Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organizations, 
Corporations and States, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES 233, 243 
(Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004) (contending individual 
responsibility and the lack of consensus among states recognizing corporate 
criminal responsibility were major factors); Kai Ambos, General Principles of 
Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L. FORUM 1, 7 (1999) (contending the 
“inclusion of collective liability would deflect from the Court’s jurisdictional 
focus, which is on individuals,” [as well as] problems of evidence and the lack of 
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Nevertheless, as Clapham observes, “although the proposal was 
eventually abandoned,” by even countenancing the inclusion of 
“legal persons” (i.e., corporations) within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
“one could conclude that international law can actually create 
directly enforceable duties for corporations.”175 Furthermore, the 
current absence does not preclude the inclusion of a provision 
allowing for corporate criminal responsibility at some future date.176 
Moreover, several countries, including Australia, Canada, and France, 
have incorporated the Rome Statute into their respective domestic laws 
without drawing a jurisdictional distinction between natural and legal 
persons, allowing for corporate criminal responsibility for heinous 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in their 
domestic courts.177 
A. CORPORATE CRIME REMAINS ON THE AGENDA…SORT OF 
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional impediments to trying 
corporations per se, corporate conduct has come under scrutiny in the 
modern-day international criminal tribunals. Following the precedent 
established by the Nuremberg prosecutions of German industrialists, 
two cases at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) successfully prosecuted corporate leaders for utilising the 
resources of their corporations and their positions of authority to 
commit war crimes and genocide, as well as allowing their 
employees to engage in such crimes.178 
universally recognized common standards for corporate liability led to the 
rejection).   
 175.  Andrew Clapham, Globalization and the Rule of Law, 61 REV. OF INT’L. 
COMM’N. OF JURISTS 17, 32 (1999); See also Mongelard, supra note 108, at 673 
(stating there is nothing to indicate duties to make reparations could not be 
imposed on a legal person). 
 176.  CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 25, at 56 
(contending that the detraction of focus on individual criminal responsibility, 
problems of evidence, and lack of a recognized standard of corporate responsibility 
“should not preclude the States Parties to the ICC Statute from including a 
provision for corporate criminal responsibility in the future.”). 
 177.  Id. at 56; ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME 
AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE 
BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES 16 (2006).  
 178.  See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, 2 (Int’l. 
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (finding Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and 
Ngeze guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide and persecution and extermination as crimes 
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Similarly, corporate crime has been on the ICC’s agenda. In 2003, 
the first Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, publicly 
suggested that he was prepared to investigate and prosecute 
corporate executives for international crimes, or complicity 
thereof.179 He referred to the trade in African blood-diamonds, and 
the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, noting that that 
those who direct operations in the extractives industries “may also be 
the authors of crimes, even if they are based in other countries.”180 
Despite Ocampo’s public statements, no formal investigations, let 
alone prosecutions, of corporate leaders have yet occurred.181 
against humanity); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement 
and Sentence, 250 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000) (finding Musema 
incurred criminal responsibility as the superior for the acts committed by 
employees of the Gisovu Tea Factory during the attack); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 81(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf (finding 
Tadic individually responsible for criminal violations); see also Simpson, supra 
note 24, at 76; Forty-Eighth Session Report, supra note 102, at 43 (discussing 
individual criminal responsibility); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility 
and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-
STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 196 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (discussing 
private actors’ international responsibility when they violate international norms); 
KARAVIAS, supra note 174, at 91 (contending “the private nature of corporate 
conduct does not bar the possibility that the corporation may incur international 
criminal responsibility”); Simpson, supra note 24, at 76 (discussing the move to 
individual responsibility for international criminal acts); KIRSTEN J. FISHER, 
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: HOLDING AGENTS 
OF ATROCITY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE WORLD 74 (2012).   
 179.  See Julia Graff, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal 
Court: Blood and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF, no. 2, 2004, at 1; James Podgers, Corporations in Line of Fire, A.B.A. J. 
(Jan. 2, 2004, 8:23AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
corporations_in_line_of_fire (suggesting that it is possible for corporations to 
facilitate conduct that leads to violations of international law, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity, and, as a result, it is possible officials of the companies 
could be prosecuted). 
 180.  Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Assembly 
of State Parties to the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 
2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C073586C-7D46-4CBE-B901-067 
2908E8639/143656/LMO_20030908_En.pdf.  
 181.  All Cases, supra note 172. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: LEX FERENDA,  
NOT LEX LATA…YET 
A thorough analysis of Nuremberg-era jurisprudence raises 
divergent understandings of what this seminal moment in the 
development of international law says about corporate accountability 
under that law. Whether one chooses the narrow judicial or the wider 
legal lens largely depends on one’s own legal philosophy and one’s 
own pre-conceived biases to the issue at hand.182 
The doctrinal answer may be to conclude that at the present time 
corporations are not liable under international law for violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law, and, thus, the judicial lens is 
ascendant. Yet, an analysis of the literature supporting a legal-lens 
perspective on the Nuremberg-era’s legacy on corporate liability 
under international law may leave the objective reader with the 
feeling that this is a more hopeful prescription than description; 
advocating what international law should be (lex ferenda), not what 
it is (lex lata).183 
However, the orthodox viewpoint is persistently challenged by the 
inexorable humanization of international law.184 As Justice 
Bargawanath of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon observed in 2014, 
there is an international trend towards recognizing the liability of 
corporations under international criminal law.185 Confirming 
 182.  Rufus E. Miles Jr., The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV 399 (1978) (“Miles’ Law says: “[w]here you stand depends on where 
you sit.”); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE 
USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS (1986).   
 183.  See, e.g., Joseph, Taming the Leviathans, supra note 15, at 186.  
 184.  Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (2006). See also 
HEIKILIA VERRIJIN STUART & MARLISE SIMMONS, THE PROSECTUOR AND THE 
JUDGE: BENJAMIN FERENCZ AND ANTONIO CASSESE: INTERVEWS AND WRITINGS 
(2009); Janne E. Nijman, Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: 
Revisiting the ‘Realist Theory’ of International Legal Personality, in NON-STATE 
ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 98 (Math Noortmann & Cedric 
Ryngaert, eds., 2010); Muchlinski, supra note 19, at 30; Kristian Fauchald & Jo 
Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2009) (contending “the role of corporations in the 
commission of international crimes in conflict zones is widely recognized, and 
prosecuting corporations is increasingly recognized conceptually at a national 
level.”). 
 185.  Prosecutor v. Akhbar Beirut S.A.L, Case No. STL-14-06/I/CJ/, Decision in 
Contempt Proceedings, 11 (Special Trib. for Leb. Jan. 31, 2014) (discussing a 
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corporate liability for conflict-driving conduct—as a matter of 
positive law—will require the integration of corporations into the 
positive law of the International Criminal Court, or, alternatively, the 
recognition of corporate liability for international law violations in 
other jurisdictions such as domestic legal systems, a process already 
underway. Nevertheless, the importance of the socio-legal lens is that 
it serves as a reminder that the value of international law (and 
corporate liability thereof), is to a large extent dependent on the 
capability and requisite political will to enforce it.186 The absence of 
effective, respected enforcement measures bedevils public 
international law.187 The socio-legal lens demands that, aside from 
questions of the appropriateness or legal liability of corporations 
under international law reflected in the choice of the judicial or legal 
lens, the practical question of ensuring accountability in the real-
world is salient and similarly problematic. 
Going forward, if and when the U.S. Supreme Court, other 
countries’ high courts, and international tribunals definitively weigh 
in on the question of corporate liability for international crimes—
whether it is in the context of future ATS litigation or otherwise—
they will doubtless pay heed to Nuremberg’s legacy. In turn, their 
interpretation of this seminal moment in the development of 
international law, will go some way to determining the future 
effectiveness of the international legal order and its ability to respond 
to the ever-increasing social, economic and political power of the 
contemporary multi-national corporation. 
What seems probable is whatever their formal status within the 
international legal system may be today, corporations will 
necessarily be sewn more firmly into the fabric of a globalised legal 
order in the decades to come.188 Indeed, in that regard the words  
 
recent survey of corporate liability in Europe identifying “a general trend in most 
countries toward bringing corporate entities to book for their criminal acts or the 
criminal acts of their officers.”). 
 186.  PORTMANN, supra note 3, at 225 (asserting international rules exist as an 
effect of actual State interests).  
 187.  Mongelard, supra note 108, at 671 (discussing the difficulty in asserting 
companies’ duty to make reparation for damages resulting from a breach of 
international obligations because no enforcement mechanism provides for liability 
of non-state entities). 
 188.  Backer, supra note 15, at 389.  
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penned in 1946 by Lord Quincy Wright, legal advisor to the IMT at 
Nuremberg, provide a hopeful observation with which to conclude: 
International law is progressive . . . The pressure of necessity stimulates 
the impact of natural law and of moral ideas and converts them into rules 
deliberately and overtly recognized by the consensus of civilised 
mankind . . . I am convinced that international law has progressed, as it is 
bound to progress if it is to be a living and operative force in these days of 
widening sense of humanity.189 
 
 
 189.  Lord Quincy Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 62 L. Q. REV. 
40, 51 (1946). 
 
